THE CALL: TEXT, CONTEXT, PRETEXT
Analysis of and Commentary on the Trump-Zelensky Telephone Call of July 25
The telephone call on July 25, 2019 between President Trump and his Ukrainian counterpart Volodymyr Zelensky has provoked much interpretive attention in order to resolve its various and numerous ambiguities. Several analyses of the “rough transcript” of that call (such as those in Politico [9/25/19], Vox [9/19/19], and CNN [12/3/19]) have addressed some of these ambiguities, but they have lacked a systematic thoroughness that the call, as the primary basis of the Congressional impeachment process, would seem to require. The following analysis attempts to satisfy such a requirement.
In its “rough transcript” form, the Call (hereinafter capitalized) constitutes what literary critics would identify as a “text”; that is, “something considered as an object to be examined, explicated, or deconstructed” (definition 8a, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary). That last word, “deconstructed,” refers to a technique of analysis that explores the myriad and often contradictory ways a text can be understood. Once the text leaves the hands of its author and enters the public realm, the author, in a sense, loses their authority, for the text becomes by its publication a public thing, an “object to be examined” by an audience holding a variety of premises, world-views, agendas, prejudices, values, and the like—all of which influence their understanding of any text whatever. Such audiences are called by literary theorists “interpretive communities,” or groups of people who share a certain set of premises, world-view, etc. Each group constitutes a kind of sub-culture that influences how members understand a given text.
President Trump, as a co-author of this Text (hereinafter capitalized), has repeatedly insisted that it records a “perfect” telephone call. By “perfect” he seems to intend “open,” “transparent,” and “innocent of any nefarious intent.” In contrast, Nancy Pelosi, the House of Representatives’ Majority Leader, considers the Text as prima facie evidence of an “abuse of power,” an abuse severe enough to warrant drawing up articles of impeachment against the President. Such radically opposing interpretations of the Text have been respectively adopted by the two main parties of Congress, the Republicans, who see no offense, and the Democrats, who do. These polarized interpretations of the Text led the House Judiciary Committee on December 13 to recommend along partisan lines (23 Democrats to 17 Republicans) that the full House vote on two articles of impeachment, one for “abuse of power” and the other for “obstruction of Congress”—a vote the House has now taken, again along partisan lines, approving the articles. The question here is:
HOW IS IT POSSIBLE FOR THIS TEXT TO BE INTERPRETED AND UNDERSTOOD SO DIFFERENTLY?
The question is not merely “academic,” or hypothetical as opposed to practical, for the answer to this question is directly related to whether or not a sitting President should be removed from office. The basic answer to this question has already been suggested: the Text is suffused with ambiguity, and ambiguity requires interpretation; and interpretation is required for any text to make sense, to be meaningful.
Before any written text can be interpreted, it must first be subjected to syntactic, semantic, and logical analysis. That is, what a text actually says must be determined before it can be interpreted for what it means. [Very briefly, “meaning” as used here involves an audience’s affective response in its transactional encounter with a text. Something is ‘meaningful’ if it triggers the emotions in some way, for emotions engage both values and the will to act. No emotional response indicates indifference; and such a response implies that the text, to the audience, is meaningless.] President Trump has repeatedly insisted that we “just read the transcript!” for he seems to believe that a fair reading would lead to the exculpatory conclusion that he has committed no “abuse of power.” In legal language, res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself); so, let’s read it, carefully and thoroughly.
The reading task is complicated, however, by the Text’s particular genre: it’s a “rough transcript” of a telephone conversation. Since the Text is not a verbatim transcript, its authenticity is in question. Fortunately, however, such authenticity is not a problem in this instance since the Text we have in its permanent public form is the object of contention and interpretation, not the ephemeral telephone call itself. The main complication of the Text’s genre is rather its dual authorship. As an extemporaneous dialogue, the Text reveals each interlocutor’s response, without time for deliberation, to remarks by the other. Each interlocutor is obliged to infer the intentions and purposes of the other, and to respond in such a way as to satisfy the other’s relevant desires as well as his own. This dynamic produces a dramatic tension, for it soon becomes evident that more is at stake than congratulation and gratitude.
Appearing below, then, is a reproduction of the Text (in bold), with each segment of the extemporaneous dialogue followed by a clarifying analysis, the goal of which is to determine what the Text says. Where necessary, clarification is assisted by establishing the dialogue’s context, which limits if not determines what the Text means. Context, of course, is theoretically unlimited, from immediate context to proximate to intermediate to universal. If the audience of the Text, for example, is convinced that President Trump has been anointed by God to be His agent in a world-historical turn to the eschaton or End Times, then The Text would be understood quite differently from an audience that regards such a belief as delusional. (A very detailed academic explanation of dialogue analysis in general is: J. Caelen and A. Xuereb, “Dialogue Analysis: Pragmatic and Rhetorical Aspects” (2005) [www-clips.imag.fr > jean.caelen].)
THE TEXT: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
[T 1 = President Trump’s first dialogical speech act; Z 1 = President Zelensky’s first dialogical speech act; T 2 = President Trump’s second dialogical speech act; etc.]
T 1: Congratulations on a great victory. We all watched from the United States and you did a terrific job. The way you came from behind, somebody who wasn’t given much of a chance, and you ended up winning easily. It’s a fantastic achievement. Congratulations.
In his opening, President Trump (hereinafter referred to as “T”) congratulates President Zelensky (hereinafter referred to as “Z”) on the latter’s party, “Servant of the People,” having secured a majority in the Ukrainian Parliament after the elections of July 21. T’s use of “you” rather than “your party” suggests T’s belief that Z is not only the head of his party, but is the party itself. Such a belief seems to underlie T’s demand for total loyalty not only from his staff, but the entire Republican Congressional caucus. For T, a true leader defines and embodies the party. Anyone whose utter loyalty is suspect must be expelled. When, for example, Jeff Flake, former senator from Arizona, expressed criticism of T’s behavior, T accused him of “treason” (NY Post, 2/6/18). In addition, T’s characterization of Z’s party’s parliamentary “victory” (= Z’s “victory”) alludes to the fashion by which T himself won the U.S. presidency and his party won a majority in both houses of Congress. Indeed, in T’s earlier call to Z on April 21, in which T congratulates his counterpart on his election to the Ukrainian presidency, Z said of his election, “We had you as a great example,” and T responded by saying, “I guess, in a way, I did something similar.”
Z 1: You are absolutely right Mr. President. We did win big and we worked hard for this. We worked a lot but I would like to confess to you that I had an opportunity to learn from you. We used quite a few of your skills and knowledge and were able to use it as an example for our elections and yes it is true that these were unique elections. We were in a unique situation that we were able to achieve a unique success. I’m able to tell you the following: the first time you called me to congratulate me when I won my presidential election, and the second time you are now calling me when my party won the parliamentary election. I think I should run more often so you can call me more often and we can talk over the phone more often.
Z’s response to T’s personalization of Z’s party’s parliamentary victory is to reframe that victory as a group effort by eschewing the first person singular pronoun (“I”) and using the plural form (“we”) instead, a rhetorical turn that expresses modesty. He proceeds to flatter T as a model to follow, especially in a “unique election.” His thrice-repeated use of “unique” is unexplained, but presumably it refers to the election’s radical departure from the rule of Ukrainian history, which, from the 14th century to 1991, shows Ukraine to have been dominated by external powers. After 1991, Ukraine’s sovereign government was deeply influenced by the Russian state from without and ethnic Russians within, an influence that intensified when a majority of Ukrainians expressed a desire to split with the Eurasian Economic Union, to which Russia belongs, and to join the European Union of Western Europe. Z’s election on an anti-corruption platform indicates the triumph of the popular will, which Z apparently regards as unique in Ukrainian history. Also of interest is what follows from “I’m able to tell you the following”: he informs T of the utterly obvious fact that the occasion of T’s first call (April 21) was to congratulate Z on his election, and the second call (now, in real time) is on the occasion of “when my party won the parliamentary election.” He pointedly avoids any notion that his party’s victory was his own victory. It’s as if he’s trying to educate T, to explain the difference between a party’s leader and the party itself. Z concludes with a bit of ingratiating drollery: that since his recent successes have resulted in positive communications with T, he would welcome more such successes for the sake of an increase in such communications. Z clearly wants to cultivate a relationship with T.
T 2: (laughter) That’s a very good idea. I think your country is very happy about that.
“That’s a very good idea” refers to Z’s joke about running for office more frequently so he can enjoy more communication with T, a joke at which T expresses pleasure. The second use of the demonstrative pronoun that has an obscure referent, since it cannot refer to Z’s joke. Presumably it refers to Z’s victories.
Z 2: Well, yes, to tell you the truth, we are trying to work very hard because we wanted to drain the swamp here in our country. We brought in many new people. Not the old politicians, not the typical politicians, because we want to have a new format and a new type of government. You are a great teacher for us and in that.
It is striking that Z uses here the catch phrase—“drain the swamp”—employed repeatedly by T as one of his campaign promises. By now in the dialogue the two interlocutors have expressed mutual admiration and recognition of similar personal trajectories in their respective countries. Z’s use of T’s catch phrase indicates that he has informed himself about if not studied T’s political career. He further flatters T as “a great teacher for us” by informing T that Z and his party, following T’s example, “brought in many new people” to have “a new type of government,” certainly hallmarks of T’s intention and practice. Z seems to be aware of T’s well-known delight in being flattered, the most extreme example of which occurred during T’s first televised Cabinet meeting on June 12, 2017. At that meeting, the Cabinet members (most of whom have since departed by resignation or firing) one by one rather effusively expressed gratitude for their appointment. Reince Priebus, the former chief of staff, even referred to the senior staff’s “honor” of serving T as a “blessing.”
T 3: Well it is very nice of you to say that. I will say that we do a lot for Ukraine. We spend a lot of effort and a lot of time. Much more than the European countries are doing and they should be helping you more than they are. Germany does almost nothing for you. All they do is talk and I think it’s something that you should really ask them about. When I was speaking to Angela Merkel she talks Ukraine, but she doesn’t do anything. A lot of the European countries are the same way so I think it’s something you want to look at but the United States has been very very good to Ukraine. I wouldn’t say reciprocal necessarily because things are happening that are not good but the United States has been very very good to Ukraine.
While the occasion of the Call is ostensibly for one president to congratulate the other on the latter’s party achieving a parliamentary majority, T here transitions from congratulation to complaint: that the United States has borne more than its share of support for Ukraine in its efforts to become a sovereign and independent state; and that the European Union, as a close neighbor aligned with the aspirations of Z, should be doing more. In addition, but in an incidental way, T introduces the notion of reciprocity: “[ . . . ] the United States has been very very good to Ukraine. I wouldn’t say that it’s reciprocal necessarily because things are happening that are not good but the United States has been very very good to Ukraine.” The notion of reciprocity is sandwiched between two identical statements concerning American beneficence. The repetition, plus the use of a double intensifier (“very very”), serves to frame the notion of reciprocity, thus implying its importance. The opaque reference to “things that are not good” is ambiguous in the extreme. What “things”? That the E.U. nations aren’t doing their share? In fact, the E.U. nations and financial institutions have contributed more than $16.4 billion in grants and loans to Ukraine (that is, two-thirds of all international aid) since Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 (FactCheck.org, 9/26/19). The reference raises the question: “Not good”—for whom? That the statement follows the mention of reciprocity, and as T’s rhetoric of personalization would suggest, the “favor” requested in T 4 is being prepared here.
Z 3: Yes you are absolutely right. Not only 100%, but actually 1000% and I can tell you the following: I did talk to Angela Merkel and I did meet with her I also met and talked with Macron and I told them that they are not doing quite as much as they need to be doing on the issues with the sanctions. They are not enforcing the sanctions. They are not working as much as they should work for Ukraine. It turns out that even though logically, the European Union should be our biggest partner but technically the United States is a much bigger partner than the European Union and I’m very grateful to you for that because the United States is doing quite a lot for Ukraine. Much more than the European Union especially when we are talking about sanctions against the Russian Federation. I would also like to thank you for your great support in the area of defense. We are ready to continue to cooperate for the next steps specifically we are almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.
Z vigorously confirms American beneficence and acknowledges the European Union’s niggardliness, emphasizing the E.U.’s failure to enforce sanctions against Russia, with whom Ukraine is at war. The sanctions issue then leads Z to express gratitude for T’s support for American sanctions against Russia, noting that “even though logically, the European Union should be our biggest partner” because of that entity’s proximity to Ukraine. Z’s notion of “support” is broader than T’s appears to be, for the latter refers only to material support (money, weapons). T does not acknowledge, here or elsewhere, the sanctions against Russia or the need for Ukraine to defend itself against Russian aggression. Z then expresses his gratitude for “your great support in the area of defense.” The possessive pronoun “your” could refer either to “the United States” or to T (“I’m very grateful to you”), but the immediate context indicates clearly that Z’s gratitude is directed personally to T. Z then raises a specific issue regarding defense: “We are ready to continue to cooperate for the next steps specifically we are almost ready to buy more Javelins from the United States for defense purposes.” Here Z clearly shifts the subject of the dialogue from its congratulation/gratitude category to a proposed business transaction. Instead of being the recipient of T’s/American beneficence, Z says he is interested in purchasing a particular weapon. This shift from a benefactor-beneficiary relationship, which is one of inequality, to a proposed buyer-seller relationship, in which both members stand equally to benefit, is a striking turn in the dialogue.
T 4: I would like you to do us a favor though because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it. I would like you to find out what happened with this whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike … I guess you have one of your wealthy people … The server, they say Ukraine has it. There are a lot of things that went on, the whole situation. I think you’re surrounding yourself with some of the same people. I would like to have the Attorney General call you or your people and I would like you to get to the bottom of it. As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense ended with a very poor performance by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance, but they say a lot of it started with Ukraine. Whatever you can do, it’s very important that you do it if that’s possible.
T’s immediate response to Z’s proposed buyer-seller relationship is also striking, not only because he ignores Z’s proposal, but also because he changes the subject in the direction of the “reciprocity” idea he mentioned earlier (at T 3). The abruptness of this turn implies its importance: “I would like you to do us a favor though because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.” The rest of his response is barely coherent. T does not specify the “lot” that “our country has been going through”; nor does he explain “this whole situation with Ukraine”; nor who “they” are who say “Crowdstrike,” whatever that is; nor what “one of your wealthy people” has to do with anything; nor what “the server” is, which “they say Ukraine has.” The incoherence implies a lack of understanding of what “the whole situation” is, as if T retained some words from what “they say,” but not the whole sense of what “they say.” When, however, T says, “I think you’re surrounding yourself with some of the same people,” he hints at the issue he is awkwardly trying to articulate, a problem that Z is well aware of; indeed, he was overwhelmingly elected on his most fundamental campaign promise: to end the endemic corruption that has plagued Ukraine from the time it became a sovereign state, independent from the Russian federation. This hint is reinforced when T expresses his desire to have “the Attorney General” [of the U.S.] call you or your people and I would like you to get to the bottom of it.” It is striking that T appoints the Attorney General to be the U.S. contact in a Ukrainian investigation. The purview of the Attorney General is to investigate domestic matters only. The appropriate member of T’s senior staff would be the Secretary of State, who is responsible for foreign affairs. Later, in T 5, T adds Rudy Giuliani’s name to that of the Attorney General to be the chief American contacts to assist in an investigation of possible wrongdoing in a foreign state. The appropriateness of T’s private lawyer and the U.S. Attorney General acting on behalf of the interests of the United States is more than questionable. As T’s private lawyer, Giuliani can only represent T in his identity as a citizen, not as President; and as Attorney General, William Barr can investigate only domestic matters, not foreign matters. Introducing Barr into this matter also raises questions about Barr’s role, for the Justice Department that he leads later “advised the Director of National Intelligence to withhold from Congress a whistleblower complaint that reportedly centers around a call in which Barr is explicitly named” (Politico, 9/25/19). The President’s proposed agents are personal, not institutional. T seems to have blurred several important distinctions here. The ambiguity, however, may go beyond the patent ambiguity, latent ambiguity, and intermediate ambiguity of legal language. “No one is above the law” is a fundamental tenet of American jurisprudence; but what is the law here? As Richard Nixon once famously said, “Well, when the President does it, that means that it’s not illegal” (Frost-Nixon Interviews, Part 3, aired 5/19/1977). And T has said that Article II of the Constitution gives him “the right to do whatever I want as president” (Washington Post, 7/23/19). It looks like a ruling from the Supreme Court is needed here. A president, the Founding Fathers were at pains to insist, is not a monarch.
Much has been made of the word “though” in the first sentence of T’s response, and rightly so. In context, it is being used as a conjunctive adverb in the sense of qualifying what has been said immediately before; that is, “though” is another way of saying, In spite of the fact that what we have just acknowledged is true [that T has been very helpful to Ukraine, and he appreciates Z’s gratitude], something else that we have not yet acknowledged is also true [that the U.S.-Ukraine relationship has not been “reciprocal”]. In Z 2, Z flatters T by calling him a “ great teacher for us.” In Z 3, after expressing his gratitude for American sanctions against Russia and “support in the area of defense,” Z pivots the topic from gratitude to a business offer. Having raised the idea of reciprocity in T 3, T uses this moment of Z’s abruptly introduced business offer to reintroduce the reciprocity idea, signaled by “though.” The sense would be: Even though I acknowledge the difficulty you might have had in reciprocating my friendly gestures, I now have a request that even you, in your present difficulties, should be able to do for me. The pronoun reference shifts from first person plural objective case “us” [the U.S.] to the singular “I” (“I would like you to find out what happened [ . . . ]”), thus framing the reciprocity as a personal transaction between Z and T. Significantly, T’s request for a “favor” addresses Z’s expression of gratitude for benefits given; T does not address Z’s business offer here, nor at any time later in the Text. He appears not to be interested in the mutuality of a business deal; he is, rather, interested in reciprocity—“a mutual or cooperative exchange of favors or privileges” (American Heritage Dictionary, 2nd College Edition).
T first asks for investigations into “Crowdstrike.” This involves a conspiracy theory that Ukraine has a “server” proving that the 2016 election was hacked by Ukraine, not Russia. [This theory was categorically described in Congressional testimony by Fiona Hill, T’s former top Russian expert in the State Department’s office in Ukraine, as a “fictional narrative that has been perpetrated and propagated by the Russian security services themselves.”] T then says, “I guess you have one of your wealthy people . . . .” He fails to elaborate, but presumably he is referring to some wealthy Ukrainian who is in charge of Crowdstrike. [If that is the reference, it is false, since Crowdstrike Holdings (a cyber-security technology company based in California) is owned by co-founder Dmitri Alperovitch, a Russian-born American whose company was funded by American venture capital. The company was hired by the Democratic National Committee to remove the hacking programs originating in Russia that had infiltrated the DNC computer systems.] T then refers to the “whole nonsense” about a “whole situation” that “ended with a very poor performance by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance [ . . . ].” [Mueller, former Special Counsel appointed by the Justice Dept., had conducted a long investigation that concluded unequivocally that Russia, seeking to denigrate Hillary Clinton and to promote T’s candidacy, interfered “in a sweeping and systematic fashion” in the 2016 election. Calling Mueller “incompetent” indicates clearly that T rejects the authority or professionalism of an investigator who not only was appointed by T’s own Justice Department but had also received unanimous bipartisan acclaim for his competence and scrupulous impartiality.] The denigration of Mueller is hard to square with T’s loud embrace of that “performance” when Mueller concluded that no one in T’s campaign had actively “colluded” or conspired with Russian agents to undermine his 2016 opponent. Since possible collusion of Trump and his campaign officials with Russian agents was the chief focus of Mueller’s investigation, does T’s charge of incompetence extend to that exculpatory conclusion as well? [This no-collusion conclusion, by the way, was offered despite evidence that, according to the NY Times (4/19/19), “Trump and 18 of his associates had at least 140 contacts with Russian nationals and WikiLeaks, or their intermediaries, during the 2016 campaign and presidential transition.”] It is also worth noting that while T doesn’t bother to explain “Crowdstrike” or “server,” he does refer to the Special Prosecutor as “a man named Mueller.” The lack of parallelism is curious. If “Mueller” needs to be explained, why isn’t “Crowdstrike” or “server” explained? On the one hand T seems to assume that Z doesn’t need an explanation of obscure references; on the other hand, T offers an explanation that, if Z had been following American affairs carefully enough to understand “Crowdstrike,” he certainly would have understood “Mueller.” The confusion is doubled by T’s prefacing his complaint about Mueller’s “incompetent performance” with the phrase, “As you saw yesterday [ . . . ].” T assumes that Z had watched Mueller on television, as T apparently did, testifying before Congress the previous day, July 24! The effect is, to say the least, a bit disorienting.
To continue: The pronoun “it” appears to refer back to “the whole situation,” which itself appears to refer back to the first sentence of his response: “[ . . . ] because our country has been through a lot and Ukraine knows a lot about it.” The requested “favor” thus is in reference to an extremely vague and as-yet unnamed problem that Ukraine under Z’s leadership is uniquely positioned to help solve. T finally clarifies “the whole situation” referred to as “it”: his surmise that Ukraine, not Russia, was behind the foreign interference with the 2016 election. Although T does not mention it here, he later has insisted that Ukraine interfered on behalf of his opponent, Hillary Clinton, and against him. The Mueller report concluded definitively the opposite: that Russia meddled to promote T and smear his opponent. Since T believes this particular conclusion is false, his charge of Mueller’s incompetence now makes sense. T accepts the Mueller Report’s exculpation of collusion with Russia, but he denies the report’s findings on Russian interference; and he introduces his belief in the credibility of what “they say” about Ukraine’s involvement in “this whole situation.” T ends this response by expressing his desire to have Z “get to the bottom of it.” [We now know that the “they” of T’s reference is his private lawyer, Rudy Giuliani; former Ukrainian Prosecutor General, Yuriy Lutsenko; and Giuliani’s associates, Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman (now indicted by federal agents for conspiracy, making false statements, and falsification of records). Lutsenko has been described by Kurt Volker, former U.S. Special Representative for Ukraine, in a closed-door deposition on October 3, as having acted “in a self-serving manner, frankly making things up, in order to appear important to the United States, because he wanted to save his job.” Giuliani accepted Lutsenko’s complaint that the American ambassador to Ukraine, Marie Yovanovich, was an obstacle to his carrying out an investigation into former Vice President Joe Biden’s role in getting Viktor Shokin, former Ukrainian Prosecutor General, removed from office at the time Biden’s son, Hunter, sat on the board of Burisma. It is noteworthy that Biden, while his son was on Burisma’s board, had objected to Shokin’s failure to investigate corruption in Burisma, and by doing so was promoting U.S. State Department policy as well as that of the European Union and the International Monetary Fund.]
Z 4: Yes it is very important for me and everything that you just mentioned earlier. For me as a President, it is very important and we are open for any future cooperation. We are ready to open a new page on cooperation in relations between the United States and Ukraine. For that purpose, I just recalled our ambassador from United States and he will be replaced by a very competent and very experienced ambassador who will work hard on making sure that our two nations are getting closer. I would also like and hope to see him having your trust and your confidence and have personal relations with you so we can cooperate even more so. I will personally tell you that one of my assistants spoke with Mr. Giuliani just recently and we are hoping very much that Mr. Giuliani will be able to travel to Ukraine and we will meet once he comes to Ukraine. I just wanted to assure you once again that you have nobody but friends around us. I will make sure that I surround myself with the best and most experienced people. I also wanted to tell you that we are friends. We are great friends and you Mr. President have friends in our country so we can continue our strategic partnership. I also plan to surround myself with great people and in addition to that investigation, I guarantee as the President of Ukraine that all the investigations will be done openly and candidly. That I can assure you.
Z’s response to T’s request is an enthusiastic affirmative. He pledges to cooperate completely, expressing a strong desire for friendship and a “strategic partnership.” His rhetoric is now fully directed to expressing a personal relationship with T rather than an institutional one, for that kind of relationship is what T seems to require in order for Z to get his cooperation. He hopes the new ambassador will have “your trust and your confidence and have personal relations with you,” and that “I also wanted to tell you that we are friends.” As a token of his sincerity he announces his recall of the present Ukrainian ambassador to the U.S. (Valeriy Chaly), whom he will replace with “a very competent and very experienced ambassador.” He seems to pick up on the importance of competence to T, whose negative characterization of Mueller as “incompetent” is associated with T’s negative insinuations about Ukraine. As a further assurance of his good faith, Z brings up the name of someone who has been at the center of the allegation that Ukraine, not Russia, interfered in the 2016 election: T’s personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani, who has been assiduously doing whatever he can to help his chief client. Z expresses an eager willingness to work with Giuliani. T’s wary surmise in T 4, “I think you’re surrounding yourself with some of the same people,” is a reference to the Ukrainian officials under former president Petro Poroshenko who had expressed hostility to T’s candidacy before the 2016 election. [Note: Their hostility was rational. Before the 2016 election, T indicated that he would recognize the Russian annexation of Crimea: “The people of Crimea, from what I’ve heard, would rather be with Russia than where they were” (Politico, 8/1/16)]. Z responds: “I will make sure that I will surround myself with the best and most experienced people.” He repeats that assurance for emphasis, then repeats assurances of friendship, and adds that he will pursue “that investigation,” and that “all the investigations will be done openly and candidly.” He is obviously eager to whatever he needs to do to secure support from T and the U.S.
T 5: Good because I heard you had a prosecutor who was very good and he was shut down and that’s really unfair. A lot of people are talking about that, the way they shut your very good prosecutor down and you had some very bad people involved. Mr. Giuliani is a highly respected man. He was the mayor of New York City, a great mayor, and I would like him to call you. I will ask him to call you along with the Attorney General. Rudy very much knows what’s happening and he is a very capable guy. If you could speak to him that would be great. The former ambassador from the United States, the woman, was bad news and the people she was dealing with in the Ukraine were bad news so I just want to let you know that. The other thing, there’s a lot of talk about Biden’s son, that Biden stopped the prosecution and a lot of people want to find out about that so whatever you can do with the Attorney General would be great. Biden went around bragging that he stopped the prosecution so if you can look into it . . . it sounds horrible to me.
T’s complaint about “the prosecutor who was very good and he was shut down” is apparently a reference to Yuriy Lutsenko, the Prosecutor General under President Poroshenko. He had been taken to task by the American ambassador, Marie Yovanovich, for not investigating some of his own corrupt deputies, and for investigating some civilian anti-corruption activists, who were bringing pressure against, among others, those same deputies. (The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine [NABU] was created by the Parliament in 2015 to prosecute high-profile cases. Its director, Artem Sytnyk, “who seemed to have no political ambitions of his own and was committed to maintaining the new agency’s independence,” was warmly supported by American officials [see Adam Entous, “The Man in the Middle,” The New Yorker, 12/23/19]). Presumably, then, T’s reference to “some very bad people” is to those who were actually fighting against corruption. It’s not clear what T means by “shut down,” since Lutsenko was not fired, so he apparently means “interfered with.” Lutsenko’s predecessor, Viktor Shokin, was indeed fired as Prosecutor General by President Poroshenko after calls by the E.U., the International Monetary Fund, and the U.S. State Department that he be dismissed for failing to prosecute Ukrainian corruption. The source of T’s information is Rudy Giuliani, whom Z, well aware of Giuliani’s close relationship with T, has just referenced in the context of corruption investigations. T here affirms Giuliani’s importance, and characterizes him as “a very capable guy,” thus returning to the competence theme. T’s reference to “Biden’s son,” and his assertion that “Biden stopped the prosecution”—presumably the prosecution by Shokin of Burisma, the company that had Hunter Biden on its board of directors—is an inversion of the facts. Shokin had prosecuted Burisma for corruption in 2010-2012, before Hunter Biden joined the board in 2014, but was not investigating Burisma at the time he was fired. Perhaps the inference to be drawn is that Shokin should have prosecuted Burisma for its appointment of Hunter Biden to its board, but the idea that Joe Biden’s determination to have Shokin removed because he had started a prosecution of Burisma while his son Hunter was on its board is simply false.
Into this context of blocked prosecutions comes T’s reference to “that woman,” namely, Maria Yovanovich, whom T characterizes by the colloquialism “bad news.” The context suggests that in T’s mind, she, like former Vice President Biden, was actually preventing the prosecution of Ukrainian corruption, when in fact she was promoting it. Her work was deemed important enough for the State Department to ask her to extend her three-year appointment for an additional year, but despite her stellar reputation she was recalled only six weeks after that year began. As she was testifying before Congress, T sent out a Twitter message accusing her of one of his favorite insults, incompetence: “She started off in Somalia, how did that go?” he wrote. In fact, her career went quite well, for she has served six successive American presidents, four of them Republicans. Former Prosecutor General Yuriy Lutsenko claimed that Yovanovich had given him a “do-not-prosecute” list and was interfering with his attempts to fight corruption in Ukraine. The U.S. State Department said that Lutsenko’s claim was “an outright fabrication,” and Lutsenko subsequently recanted his false claim. The U.S. diplomatic community has since voiced strong objection to Yovanovich’s firing.
Z 5: I wanted to tell you about the prosecutor. First of all, I understand and I’m knowledgeable about the situation. Since we have won the absolute majority in our Parliament, the next prosecutor general will be 100% my person, my candidate, who will be approved, by the parliament and will start as a new prosecutor in September. He or she will look into the situation, specifically to the company that you mentioned in this issue. The issue of the investigation of the case is actually the issue of making sure to restore the honesty so we will take care of that and will work on the investigation of the case. On top of that, I would kindly ask you if you have any additional information that you can provide to us, it would be very helpful for the investigation to make sure that we administer justice in our country[.] With regard to the Ambassador to the United States from Ukraine as far as I recall her name was Ivanovich. It was great that you were the first one who told me that she was a bad ambassador because I agree with you 100%. Her attitude towards me was far from the best as she admired the previous President and she was on his side. She would not accept me as a new President well enough.
Z’s response seems to be based on a confusion. Who is “the prosecutor” of which T is speaking? Z promises that “the next prosecutor general will be 100% my person,” a statement implying that the present prosecutor general will be fired when Z takes office with a new parliamentary majority. But the present prosecutor general is Yuriy Lutsenko, the man T has just praised as “very good”! Z’s attempt to assure T that Z is “knowledgeable about the situation” seems to be in reference to what T had earlier called “this whole situation with Ukraine, they say Crowdstrike,” a “situation” that dates back to the 2016 American election. The prosecutor general then was Viktor Shokin, who was fired for insufficient prosecution of corruption by President Poroshenko at the urging of former Vice President Biden. Z must believe that T’s earlier reference to a “very good prosecutor” was to Shokin, since his determination to hire a new prosecutor implies that he believes Lutsenko is corrupt or untrustworthy. The new prosecutor, Z promises, “will look into the situation, specifically to the company that you mentioned in this issue”—presumably a reference to Burisma Holdings Ltd., the company that had Hunter Biden on its board. In fact, a month after the Call, Z did indicate his strong displeasure with Lutsenko, who then resigned his position.
Z then appears to acknowledge T’s offer to have Giuliani and the U.S. Attorney General help investigate “the company that you mentioned” (Burisma) by requesting “any additional information that you can provide to us,” thus reaffirming cooperation and cordial relations.
Z’s reference to “the Ambassador to the United States from Ukraine as far as I recall her name was Ivanovich” appears to be a misstatement. Maria Yovanovich, having been abruptly recalled by T at the time of the telephone call, was obviously the Ambassador to Ukraine from the United States, not the other way around. A simple error of speech, perhaps, but, combined with his erroneous recollection of her name, the two errors suggest nervousness and confusion. Z’s manifest confusion at the beginning of Z 5 over what “prosecutor” T seems to have in mind has an echo here. His reference to Yovanovich’s admiration of the previous president, Petro Poroshenko, and her unenthusiastic acceptance of Z as the new president, has no discernable basis. Yovanovich testified to Congress that “until I read the, you know, the summary of the conversation of the July 25th call, I thought he liked me.” Another explanation of Z’s odd response is that, in his desire to ingratiate himself with T, Z may be saying whatever he needs to say to appease T’s desires. Z is obviously desperate for American support. According to the NY Times (10/23/19) and the Washington Post (12/3/19), Ukraine was aware of the “hold” on U.S. military aid it was expecting; but even if this is inaccurate, Z was still very desirous of T coming through on his offer of a White House visit. He had received a letter dated May 29 and signed by T offering that visit without conditions. Two months later he was still waiting.
T 6: Well, she’s going to go through some things. I will have Mr. Giuliani give you a call and I am also going to have Attorney General Barr call and we will get to the bottom of it. I’m sure you will figure it out. I heard the prosecutor was treated very badly and he was a very fair prosecutor so good luck with everything. Your economy is going to get better and better I predict. You have a lot of assets. It’s a great country. I have many Ukrainian friends, their [sic] incredible people.
T’s statement that Yovanovich “is going to go through some things” is a vague but dark prediction of unpleasant consequences following her removal from the embassy in Kiev. Since T is in a position of power over her, his prediction has the force of a threat; and, according to her testimony at her Congressional hearing, such was Yovanovich’s reaction upon learning of the phone call. T repeats his offer to have his personal lawyer and the U.S. Attorney General contact Z to help “get to the bottom of it,” the “it” being apparently two related matters: (1) a renewed investigation of possible corruption within Burisma Holdings, which former V.P. Joe Biden (to shield his son Hunter, T believes) allegedly interrupted in 2015 by withholding American aid until the patently corrupt Ukrainian prosecutor general Viktor Shokin was replaced; and (2) a supposed attempt in 2019 by former prosecutor general Yuriy Lutsenko to reopen an investigation into Burisma and the Bidens’ alleged corrupt involvement with that company. That reopening of an investigation, T seems to believe, was discouraged or even blocked by Ambassador Yovanovich.
Again, as in T 5, T’s reference to “the prosecutor” is ambiguous: it could be either Shokin or Lutsenko, but the immediate context indicates Yovanovich’s involvement, not Biden’s, so T is apparently referring to Lutsenko. T’s characterization of Lutsenko as “a very fair prosecutor” is strenuously denied by all American Embassy officials in Ukraine. Kurt Volker, former special envoy, described Lutsenko as “self-serving [ . . . ], frankly making things up, in order to appear important to the United States.” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State George Kent “accused Lutsenko of ‘peddling false information in order to exact revenge’ against Yovanovich and his domestic rivals’” (see Entous, New Yorker, 12/23/19). Yovanovich in her Congressional testimony put the matter thus: “When our anti-corruption efforts got in the way of a desire for profit or power, Ukrainians [such as Lutsenko] who preferred to play by the old, corrupt rules sought to remove me. What continues to amaze me is that they found Americans willing to partner with them and, working together, they apparently succeeded in orchestrating the removal of a U.S. Ambassador” (see The Guardian, 11/15/19). Two such Americans “willing to partner with them” are Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman. Another is Rudy Giuliani, whom Lutsenko found to be in eager pursuit of any information that might be helpful to his chief client, T.
T ends this section of the dialogue wishing Z “good luck,” a prediction of prosperity for Ukraine (presumably aided by American support and goodwill), and a gratuitous assertion that he has “many Ukrainian friends.”
Z 6: I would like to tell you that I also have quite a few Ukrainian friends that live in the United States. Actually last time I travelled to the United States, I stayed in New York near Central Park and I stayed at the Trump Tower. I will talk to them and I hope to see them again in the future. I also wanted to thank you for your invitation to visit the United States, specifically Washington DC. On the other hand, I also want to ensure you that we will be very serious about the case and will work on the investigation. As to the economy, there is much potential for our two countries and one of the issues that is very important for Ukraine is energy independence. I believe we can be very successful and cooperating on energy independence with United States. We are already working on cooperation. We are buying American oil but I am very hopeful for a future meeting. We will have more time and more opportunities to discuss these opportunities and to get to know each other better. I would like to thank you very much for your support.
Z’s comment about having friends in the United States is a bit obscure, but he was the lead actor in a Russian language comic fantasy movie, Love in the Big City (2009), that was filmed in New York City in 2008. Mentioning Ukrainian friends who have chosen to live in the U.S. complements T’s mention of having “many Ukrainian friends”; and Z’s reference to staying at the Trump Tower is of course an ingratiating compliment.
Z then uses these references to trans-Atlantic friendships to return to what appears to be his primary concern—that T honor the invitation he made to Z in his earlier April 21 telephone call congratulating Z on his election, namely: “When you’re settled in and ready, I’d like to invite you to the White House.” The April 21 call deserves attention. In it, despite T’s qualifying the invitation by stipulating “when you’re settled in and ready,” Z’s immediate response indicates that he understands the invitation as unqualified: “Well, thank you for the invitation. We accept the invitation and look forward to the visit.” It is worth noting that T’s qualified invitation comes in the context of Z’s seven-times-repeated request that T himself attend Z’s inauguration as President in Ukraine. T actually commits, however, only to send a delegation. It is obviously of great importance to Z that the U.S. President indicate his support of Z and Ukraine by either attending Z’s inauguration, or, failing that, offering Z a state visit to the White House.
To return to the Text: Z then gets back (“on the other hand”) to his benefactor’s primary concern: “the case” (the alleged blocking by former V.P. Biden of the former prosecutor general’s investigation into Burisma Holdings) and “the investigation” into that alleged blocking already begun by Rudy Giuliani. After offering assurances that T’s concern will be seriously addressed, Z pivots to the Ukrainian economy, which T has just predicted will improve. Here Z says what appears to be a contradiction: “I believe we can be very successful and cooperating on energy independence with United States. [ . . . ] We are buying American oil but I am very hopeful for a future meeting.” How is it possible to have “energy independence with [the] United States”? If Ukraine is buying American oil, then Ukraine is dependent on the U. S. “Energy independence” normally means that a state would be able to meet its energy needs with its own resources. Certainly that is how the phrase is used in the U.S., especially with regard to decreasing reliance on oil imports from the volatile Middle East. This contradiction may have something to do with T’s concern about Burisma Holdings, but that company is primarily involved with natural gas, not oil; and Ukrainian energy resources, at least those in production, are 89% gas and only 7.9% oil (see www.export.gov). Perhaps Z is looking towards trading liquefied natural gas (LNG) for American oil? Still, as it is, his statement is unclear.
T 7: Good. Well, thank you very much and I appreciate that. I will tell Rudy and Attorney General Barr to call. Thank you. Whenever you would like to come to the White House, feel free to call. Give us a date and we’ll work that out. I look forward to seeing you.
The antecedent of the demonstrative pronoun that is at first obscure, but T’s next sentence makes clear that his reference is to Z’s assurances about “the investigation” that T wants Ukrainian prosecutors to pursue with the help of “Rudy and Attorney General Barr.” (Note: The offices of both the Attorney General and of the new Ukrainian prosecutor general, Ruslan Ryaboshapka, have denied that any such call by the A.G. has been sent or received.) T then responds to Z’s reminder that T had earlier offered a coveted White House visit, and is now leaving it up to Z to set a date. When, two months after the Call, Z and T met in New York City at the United Nations, Z, still seeking a White House meeting, noted to T, “you forgot to tell me the date.” As reported by the Washington Post (11/22/19), “Amid awkward laughter from their reporter-dominated audience, Trump pointed at his staff. ‘They’ll tell you the date,’ he said.” According to testimony from David Holmes (counselor for political affairs at the American Embassy in Kiev), Z was told on June 28 by administration staffers that a WH visit was contingent upon “the investigation.” On July 2, in Toronto, special envoy to Ukraine Kurt Volker told Z the same thing. On July 10, U.S. Ambassador to the E.U. Gordon Sondland told Ukrainian officials the same thing. Just before the Call, Kurt Volker sent a text message to Andriy Yermak, Z’s chief aide, saying the same thing. Since dangling the invitation to Z, over a dozen foreign delegations have officially visited T at the WH, including Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on December 10. Z is still waiting for a date to be set.
Z 7: Thank you very much. I would be very happy to come and would be happy to meet with you personally and get to know you better. I am looking forward to our meeting and I also would like to invite you to visit Ukraine and come to the city of Kyiv which is a beautiful city. We have a beautiful country which would welcome you. On the other hand, I believe that on September 1 we will be in Poland and we can meet in Poland hopefully. After that, it might be a very good idea for you to travel to Ukraine. We can either take my plane and go to Ukraine or we can take your plane, which is probably much better than mine.
Z expresses pleasure at T’s apparent confirmation of the offer of a White House visit that the latter had made in the April call, of which Z has just reminded T (Z 6). Z again offers a reciprocal visit to Ukraine, where T would be welcomed, and suggests getting together in Poland among forty world leaders at a commemoration of the 80th anniversary of the beginning of World War II. (Citing the threat of Hurricane Dorian, T later canceled this trip and sent V.P. Pence instead.) He closes by again flattering T on the likely superiority of Air Force One over its Ukrainian counterpart.
Despite T’s absence, the event in Poland proved to be consequential regarding Z’s strong desire for “energy independence.” The apparent contradiction in Z 6 is here resolved when by “energy independence,” Z means independence from Russia. Among the business accomplished in Poland, a memorandum signed by President Duda of Poland, V.P. Pence of the U.S., and President Zelensky declares the signatories’ intention to buy liquefied natural gas from the United States. The gas would be sold to Poland, and then Poland would sell it to Ukraine via an expanded gas transmission infrastructure. The idea is to help the U.S. profit from its current excess of natural gas reserves, to help Poland profit from its markup as a middleman, and to help Ukraine become independent of Russia, which invaded Ukraine in 2014, annexed Crimea, and is threatening to annex more. As noted by Oleksandr Danylyuk, Ukraine’s former National Security Secretary, “One of the steps to ensure energy independence of our country will be to facilitate the supply of liquefied gas through Poland.” (Danylyuk resigned on September 27 over his involvement in the notoriously corrupt dealings of Privatbank, Ukraine’s largest lender [See Kyiv Post, “Zelensky Revives Dialogue with Poland,” (9/2/19) and rferl.org, 10/3/19]).
To understand the complexity of the economics and politics involved, three complicating facts should be considered: (1) more than a third of Russian gas exports currently cross Ukrainian territory on their way to European Union consumers; (2) Russia is in the process of building a massive pipeline bypassing Ukraine through the Baltic Sea, thus increasing its ability to supply gas directly to the E.U.; and (3) President Trump has recently argued for the readmission of Russia to the G7, the annual meeting of the world’s largest advanced economies. President Zelensky continues to get mixed, if not contradictory, messages from his American counterpart. On the one hand, Trump says he supports Ukraine; on the other, he supports Ukraine’s implacable enemy, Russia. [For the above information, see Kyiv Post, (9/2/19).]
Another complicating fact involves two associates of Trump’s personal lawyer, Rudy Giuliani: namely, Soviet-born Florida businessmen Lev Parnas and Igor Fruman. According to a report in Time magazine, Parnas and Fruman “leveraged their political connections [with the Republican Party] to pursue a deal to export natural gas from the U.S. to Ukraine intended to benefit Republican donors and friends of Donald Trump’s family.” To accomplish this plan, they needed to strike a deal with Naftogaz, Ukraine’s state-owned gas company. But Naftogaz was the target of anti-corruption efforts backed by Marie Yovanovich, the U.S. Ambassador, who was following official State Department policy to support prosecution of system-wide corruption in the Ukrainian political-business establishment. That establishment under President Zelensky’s immediate predecessor, Petro Poroshenko, had pressured Naftogaz’s CEO, Andriy Kobolyev, “to forgive millions in loans to a Ukrainian oligarch, Dmitry Firtash, who is closely aligned with Russian President Vladimir Putin, according to people familiar with the effort.” For their plan to succeed, Parnas and Fruman believed that Ambassador Yovanovich needed to be replaced, and this idea coincided with Giuliani’s desire “to push Yovanovich aside and convince Ukraine’s leaders to investigate Trump’s political rival, Joe Biden, and his son Hunter’s business ties with another Ukrainian energy company called Burisma” (all references to the Time article of 12/23/19).
Marie Yovanovich was recalled from her post on May 20 on the order of President Trump. Parnas and Fruman were arrested on October 9 at a Washington airport as they, carrying one-way tickets, were about to board a plane to Europe. They were charged with conspiracy, making false statements, and falsification of records in a case focused on campaign finance violations.
T 8: Okay, we can work that out. I look forward to seeing you in Washington and maybe in Poland because I think we are going to be there at that time.
As noted above, T chose not to attend the event in Poland, citing his concerns about Hurricane Dorian. T has not yet visited Ukraine, nor has a date been set for Z to visit Washington, D.C.
Z 8: Thank you very much Mr. President.
Z again thanks T, returning to the original pretext of the Call—T’s expression of congratulations for Z’s party victory, and Z’s gratitude for T’s support, especially the promised White House visit.
T 9: Congratulations on a fantastic job you’ve done. The whole world was watching. I’m not sure it was so much of an upset but congratulations.
T likewise returns to the Call’s pretext. T’s comment that he is “not sure that it [Z’s party’s parliamentary victory] was so much of an upset” seems to contradict his opening statement: “The way you came from behind, somebody who wasn’t given much of a chance, and you ended up winning easily.” In context, two explanations for this contradiction come to mind. (1) In the April 21 telephone call, in which he congratulates Z on winning the election to the presidency, T says: “I think you will do a great job. I have many friends in Ukraine who know you and like you. I have many friends from Ukraine and they think—frankly—expected you to win.” Who those “friends” are, and whether they are “in” Ukraine or “from” Ukraine, is uncertain; but their belief that Z would win contrasts with “somebody who wasn’t given much of a chance.” T thus confuses, or more likely conflates, Z’s election to the presidency with Z’s party winning a parliamentary majority. As noted before (see comment to T 1), T tends to identify a leader with his party and a party with its leader. (2) Also as noted before (comment to T 1), Z has prodded T to think of Z’s political ascendency as having been modeled on T’s ascendency. In the April 21 call, after Z refers to T as “a great example,” T responds, “And it’s really an amazing thing you have done. I guess, in a way, I did something similar.” T’s victory was certainly an upset, and T has often bragged about his large margin of victory in the Electoral College (304-227) despite having lost the popular vote by almost three million.
Z 9: Thank you Mr. President. Bye bye.
Z concludes the Call with a slightly odd combination of formal address (“Mr. President”) with an informal valediction (“Bye bye”). The diction of this closing is consistent with the frequently awkward and confusing illocutionary and propositional content of the dialogue as a whole.
PRETEXT
Pretext is defined as “something that is put forward to conceal a true purpose or object; an ostensible reason; excuse” (www.Dictionary.com). The ostensible purpose of the Call was, of course, for President Trump to congratulate President Zelensky on his party’s election to a parliamentary majority. As it unfolds, however, the Call shifts to much more substantive and consequential matters, thus clearly making the congratulatory call a pretext for getting at those matters.
Pretext can also be understood, by its Latin roots, to mean “something before [pre-] the text,” or even “a text before a text.” In the case of the Call, its “pretext” in this sense would be, as hinted previously, the April 21 telephone call by President Trump to newly-elected President Zelensky. As with the July 25 Call, the ostensible purpose of the April 21 call was congratulatory; and like the July Call, the April call soon gets to matters of importance, but mainly for Zelensky. For Trump, who made the call, it would appear that his primary purpose was simply to make the acquaintance of the new President of Ukraine and congratulate him. He says nothing to indicate otherwise. Zelensky, by contrast, seems eager to ingratiate himself with Trump through flattery, telling him four times that he was “a great example” to follow. Zelensky is also eager to have Trump visit Ukraine and attend his inauguration; he repeats his invitation seven times in the course of a 16-minute conversation. After the fifth repeat Trump hints that he will accept the offer to visit Ukraine (“Well, I agree with you about your country, and I look forward to [visiting] it.”), although he makes clear that his attendance at the inauguration is unlikely (“So, we will have somebody, at a minimum, at a very, very high level, and they will be with you.”) Trump also hints at reciprocation (“When you’re settled in and ready, I’d like to invite you to the White House.”), and Zelensky jumps at it: “Well, thank you for the invitation. We accept the invitation and look forward to the visit. Thank you again. The whole team and I are looking forward to that visit.” At the very least, by this call Trump gets a sense of Zelensky’s personality and priorities. Zelensky is willing to flatter him, and he is clearly desperate to have, and to be seen as having, a powerful friend in Washington, D.C.
Perhaps what is most striking about the April 21 call is what was not said. Shortly after that call the White House released a “readout” to reporters that supposedly summarizes the call’s contents. It reads:
President Donald J. Trump spoke today with President-elect Volodymyr Zelenskyy to congratulate him on his victory in Ukraine’s April 21 election. The President wished him success and called the election an important moment in Ukraine’s history, noting the peaceful and democratic manner of the electoral process. President Trump underscored the unwavering support of the United States for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity – within its internationally recognized borders – and expressed his commitment to work together with President-elect Zelenskyy and the Ukrainian people to implement reforms that strengthen democracy, increase prosperity, and root out corruption.
As Aaron Mak at Slate.com pointed out (11/15/19), “Nowhere in the summary that the White House released on Friday does Trump bring up corruption, sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic reforms, or prosperity. So either the White House’s initial readout fabricated details about the call, or the rough transcript is incomplete.” The most likely explanation, however, of this inconsistency between “readout summary” and the rough transcript of the call is that Trump was given “talking points” (corruption, sovereignty, etc.), but he simply ignored them, as he seems to have done on the July 25 Call. One aide noted that “Trump doesn’t like written background materials [ . . . ], preferring to handle the calls himself” (apnews.com, 10/12/19). The “talking points” were likely released as a summary of the actual call, whether by mistake (showing incompetence) or by design (showing deceit). Trump and his supporters have argued that the hold he placed on congressionally-approved military aid to Ukraine was to give more time for American officials to determine that Ukraine’s endemic corruption was under control. The April 21 call cannot be offered as evidence for that motive.
CONCLUSION
So, how does it stand? Are we any closer to answering the question, “How is it possible for this Text to be interpreted and understood so differently?”
If The Text were a completely fictive invention, without any context beyond itself, it would be opaque in regard to certain details, such as “Crowdstrike” and “your very good prosecutor,” yet a careful and analytical reading could make sense of the dialogue as a “symbolic action” between the interlocutors (or speakers). Presumably the speakers are engaged in meaningful behavior: they speak purposefully, and use their words to effect certain results. An observer can infer much by being attentive to details such as gestures, facial expressions, etc., but even when all that is available is a written text, much can be validly inferred.
For an example of valid inference from the Text separate from any external context, turn to T 4, where T complains to Z about “the whole situation with Ukraine.” T says to Z, “As you saw yesterday, that whole nonsense ended with a very poor performance by a man named Robert Mueller, an incompetent performance.” Reading this in its historical context, we know that the Call took place on July 25, and we know that “yesterday” would thus be July 24, the day on which Special Counsel Robert Mueller testified to Congress in a televised hearing about the report he submitted to the Justice Department on March 22. Yet we need no historical context to validly infer that T’s feelings of contempt for “Robert Mueller” are fresh, for Mueller’s “incompetent performance” occurred “yesterday.” We also know that T asserts “a lot” of “the whole nonsense” seems to have “started with Ukraine,” which would likely put the new Ukrainian president on the defensive, and indeed his response in Z 4 confirms this effect. We then have to explain the inconsistency of T referring to “a man named Robert Mueller” when he has just prefaced his complaint with, “As you saw yesterday [ . . . ]”! T assumes that Z “saw” the “performance” featuring “Robert Mueller”; but if Z had seen the “performance,” why would T refer to “a man named Robert Mueller”? Why would Z need to be informed about Mueller if Z has seen the “performance”? This just doesn’t make sense. Such an inconsistency can only be meaningful if it is interpreted as an expression of T’s unconscious mind. That is, T consciously knows that the likelihood of Z’s having watched the “performance” is very small, so his assumption that Z did watch it reveals an unconscious projection on T’s part, since T certainly viewed the “performance,” and with understandably great attention. Otherwise, the inconsistency makes no sense whatever. A careful reader might make a marginal notation –“narcissistic projection?”– and keep it in mind while reading further, on the lookout for other instances of incoherence that could be explained by unconscious expression.
So, one reason different readers can come to different interpretations or understandings of the Text is that both speakers–in addition to expressing themselves awkwardly and confusedly under the stress of their respective roles as national leaders dealing with high-stakes matters, and each distrustful of the other!–are not adept practitioners of clear English.
Another reason for the opposing interpretations of the Text—and likely the main reason—is the existence of two polar opposite “interpretive communities.” Critical reading is a difficult and refined skill. Lacking that skill, a predisposition to interpret the Text and President Trump’s dialogical goals favorably (“pro-Trump”) or unfavorably (“anti-Trump”) is likely to prevail.
For too many reasons to name and explain here, the national electorate has split in half over an ideological division that would seem inevitable given a two-party political system. Each party representing one half of the nation seeks power to impose its will on the other half; compromise is regarded as defeat; and each views the other as an enemy to be defeated rather than a neighbor or a partner to be conciliated. It is therefore unsurprising that one side sees the Text as, if not “perfect,” at least a justifiable and even praiseworthy performance on President Trump’s part; whereas the other side sees it as prima facie evidence of wrongdoing, an “abuse of power” deserving impeachment and removal from office.
The Text, in its Context and including its Pretext (in both senses as described above), however, is not a Rorschach test, an inkblot to make of what you will. Such an interpretation has value as providing insight into an observer’s unique psychological condition. The “rough transcript” of the Call (the Text), however, does not mean whatever one wants it to mean, or sees it to mean. It is a public document that provides evidence, as over half of the U.S. House of Representatives believe, of impeachable behavior. That only members of one party believe this, and that no members of another party believe this, indicates radically different and opposing interpretations. Each party believes that its interpretation is the “correct” one. But interpretation is an opinion, and opinions can be “correct” only dogmatically. An interpretative opinion about the meaning of any text (or event, or image, or sign, or symbol), in order to have any value whatsoever, must first pass the test of validity.
An interpretive opinion, like any opinion, can have validity only if it meets two criteria: (1) It is consistent with all known and proven facts; and (2) it is consistent with itself. If, for example, an interpreter accepts as a fact that Crowdstrike Holdings is owned by a Ukrainian oligarch, any inferences or arguments based on that acceptance would be invalid since it is a proven fact that Crowdstrike is owned by an American of Russian descent. Likewise, if an interpreter maintains at one point of their interpretative argument that the Text demonstrates Trump’s long-standing concern for Ukraine’s welfare, but at another point notes that Trump has expressed negative feelings for Ukraine, the interpretation self-contradicts and is therefore invalid, at least on that point. [Note: Paul Manafort, Trump’s former campaign manager, “was forced to resign after documents emerged in Ukraine that suggested he had received off-the-books payments from a pro-Russian political party. President Trump and his supporters say that by releasing the documents, Ukrainian officials unfairly interfered to support his Democrat opponent Hillary Clinton” (BBC News, 11/15/19). Also, as reported by the Washington Post (11/2/19), at a meeting with three of his top advisors in the Oval Office, Trump railed, “‘They [the Ukrainian government] tried to take me down’ [ . . . ] ‘They are horrible, corrupt people.’ [ . . . ] In the end, most U.S. officials agreed that Trump’s anger with Ukraine, like many of his grievances, was connected with the 2016 election and his feeling that Ukraine was responsible for the humiliating fall of Paul Manafort.”]
A 123-page report was provided by the Republican National Committee for Republican members of Congress in preparation for the December 4 Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry hearings. That report and the minority party’s arguments based on it have been roundly criticized in numerous publications and praised in others. An application of the two criteria for validity, however, yields many problems with that report’s claims. Here are a few of those problems as presented by the Washington Post (12/5/19):
- “Trump asked Zelensky for a favor for the country, not for him”
The analysis of Z 4 notes the transition from the initial plural pronouns “our” and “us” to the first-person singular “I.” Additionally, if “our country has been through a lot” is understood as a reference to the troubling report of Robert Mueller released on April 18 and reprised by Mueller’s televised testimony on the day before the Call, how could Ukraine possibly help in healing that anxious time? Apparently, by helping to discredit the Mueller report, which led to Paul Manafort’s indictment and conviction for, among other things, having “given 2016 polling data to an associate with alleged ties to Russian intelligence” (Washington Post, 1/8/19).
- “Zelensky said the call was okay”
Zelensky was not in a position to contradict Trump. He was and still is a petitioner seeking to please a patron, and as argued earlier, he was eager to find any means whatever to get Trump to give support to Ukraine through sanctions, military aid, and the powerful optics of a White House visit and/or a state visit by Trump to Ukraine.
- “Zelensky eventually got his military aid”
The timing suggests that the “hold” on military aid was released (on September 11) only after Trump was briefed by staff lawyers in late August that a whistleblower’s complaint had been filed with the Inspector General for the intelligence community, Michael Atkinson, who decided it should be submitted to Congress. If the Republicans’ argument is valid, they will have to explain the obvious implications of the timing. What changed Trump’s mind to lead him to release the aid other than fear that he had just lost his leverage over Zelensky to investigate the 2016 election and the Bidens’ connection to Burisma? Satisfaction that Ukraine’s former endemic corruption is now being effectively addressed? On what basis? Satisfaction that the E.U. is now providing its due share of assistance to Ukraine? On what basis? If there are valid bases for these claims, they are not in the public realm.
- “Trump doesn’t say ‘Investigate Democrats to get your money’ on the call.”
What on earth has Trump’s claim of malfeasance on the Bidens’ part have to do with present Ukrainian corruption? How could “proof” of such malfeasance have any bearing on present American-Ukrainian relations? Joe Biden left office three years ago, and Hunter Biden left the Burisma board of directors in January of 2019. Yes, poor judgment on the Bidens’ part is now clear: the whiff of nepotism and conflict of interest is strong. The ethics are not good, but no evidence whatever has emerged that anything illegal was done. Given the context, the only valid reason that Trump mentioned the Bidens and Burisma was to get help from a foreign power to smear the political opponent that he most feared. At the time of the Call, national polls showed Biden leading all Democrat candidates by as many as 19 points, and an NBC News/WSJ poll showed Trump behind four Democrat candidates in the run-up to the 2020 election (MSNBC, “Morning Joe,” 7/15/19).
- “In subsequent meetings with Zelensky, no one demanded a quid pro quo”
This is a patently false statement. E.U. Ambassador Sondland testified that Zelensky asked about aid in September, when he met V.P. Pence. “After that meeting, Sondland told a Zelensky aide that they needed to announce political investigations to get their military aid.” Other diplomats testified that they told Zelensky in early July that his coveted White House visit was conditioned on a quid pro quo. At a meeting of Zelensky and two U.S. senators, the former asked about the aid again and was told that only Trump could release it (NY Times, 11/7/19). Indeed, Zelensky had set up an interview with Fareed Zakaria to be televised on CNN to announce an investigation into the Bidens and Burisma, but canceled the interview after the whistleblower complaint was made public. According to former national security advisor John Bolton, the quid pro quo (or reciprocal “favor”) was a “drug deal” cooked up by Trump and his closest associates (The New Yorker, 11/13/19). Acting Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney acknowledged unashamedly at a press conference on October 17 that the military aid was held up to put pressure on Ukraine to pursue the requested investigations, although he later tried to deny that that was what he said.
The above facts and logical inferences support the articles of impeachment that have been passed by the House of Representatives. Whether those articles—“abuse of power” and “obstruction of Congress”—are sufficient to provide justification for removing President Trump from his office is a matter for the Senate to decide. The above analysis and commentary does not address the second article because the focus has been on the Text, its Context and its Pretext. It will have to suffice here to note that the President has issued orders that no one employed in the federal government may honor a request or a subpoena by Congress to testify about what they know concerning the Ukrainian affair. A few principled federal employees—who are also citizens–have declined to agree with that order and have testified, thus honoring the oath each of them has taken:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose or evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter: So help me God.
It is hard to justify the President’s obstruction of Congress’s Constitutional duty to oversee the actions of the Executive and to subpoena witnesses in conducting this oversight. “Executive privilege” is of course the standing justification, and it is based on the separation-of-powers doctrine embedded in the Constitution’s very structure, as Chief Justice Warren Burger explained in the unanimous majority opinion re: U.S. v. Nixon. In that opinion Burger emphasized the validity and importance of “executive privilege” in protecting confidential communications within the Executive branch; but the particular circumstances of President Nixon’s claim sufficed to deny that claim. He wrote: “On the basis of our examination of the record we are unable to conclude that the District Court erred in ordering the inspection [of subpoenaed documents, namely, tape recordings of discussions in the Oval Office]. Accordingly we affirm the order of the District Court that subpoenaed materials be transmitted to that court” (see Section IV, D, United States v. Nixon[1974]).
CODA
Let us encourage the Senate trial of the impeached President to proceed. Let the Senatorial jury hear all the relevant evidence and all the relevant witnesses for the prosecution and the defense. Let the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court be impartial and rule justly. Let the Senators focus on what is best for the Nation—the whole Nation—and do what they can to leave their partisan passions behind as they make their decisions. If we cannot reconcile the differences between the Red and the Blue, we may be heading toward a revived confrontation between the Blue and the Gray.
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RES PUBLICA 